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Kinnard: Forging the Shield: Eisenhower and National Security for the 21st

Showalter, Dennis E., ed. Forging the Shield:
Eisenhower and National Security for the 21st
Century. Chicago: Imprint, 2005. 236pp. $24.95

Dwight D. Eisenhower’s greatest
achievement as president came in the
area of foreign policy and related defense matters. In the making and managing of strategic policy he was a strong,
active, and effective leader. This book is
an uneven collection of essays devoted
to Eisenhower’s presidential influence
on foreign policy and national security,
essays that were presented at a symposium held in January 2005 at the National Defense University.
The lead paper, “Reflections on Eisenhower, the Cold War, and My Father,”
by Sergei N. Khrushchev, provides an
interesting recollection of Nikita
Khrushchev’s attitude toward Eisenhower and the United States. According
to Sergei Khrushchev, a Brown University professor and himself a veteran of
the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, his
father, like many veterans of the “Great
Patriotic War,” viewed Eisenhower as a
former comrade in arms and thus welcomed his election as president. The elder Khrushchev was highly respectful of
the danger posed by potential nuclear
war and sought only equality in relations
with the United States and the Eisenhower administration. Questions emerge
as to how much new information Sergei
Khrushchev’s memoir-analysis reveals,
and how much is a son’s defense of a
father. However, to a large segment of
students, Professor Khrushchev’s reflections provide an interesting look at the
key foreign power’s opposing viewpoint
during the Eisenhower presidency.
The collection’s strongest work is Alan
Millet’s “Eisenhower and the Korean
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War.” It was a conflict that Eisenhower
inherited when elected and one that he
knew he had to end. Millet traces Ike’s
indirect involvement from the period
when he was chief of staff after World
War II until his pledge in the 1952 campaign that if elected “I shall go to Korea,”
a pledge that Eisenhower understood
needed rapid redemption.
With considerable insight Millet traces
Eisenhower’s efforts to end the war and
provide a defense policy for the long
haul, based on concepts that Ike later
set forth in his memoir. These concepts
relied on deterrence, stressed the role of
nuclear technology, placed heavy reliance on allied land forces around the
Soviet periphery, and emphasized economic strength through reduced defense budgets. The outcome was the
New Look strategy of the 1950s.
R. Cargill Hall’s essay, “Clandestine
Victory,” is a competent account of the
development of increasingly sophisticated aircraft and early satellites tasked
with aerial surveillance and of the intelligence they provided, as well as of their
influence on decision making. However, the paper deteriorates into an argument for further eye-in-the-sky
commitments to counter twenty-firstcentury terrorism. Hall’s argument
seems more public relations for an institutional constituency than a reasoned
scholarly analysis and conclusion. Terrorism, at its most effective and frightening, depends on surreptitious
individual initiatives that in general
defy large-scale overhead surveillance.
One area that perhaps could have been
developed more explicitly is Eisenhower’s role and technique in controlling the defense budgetary process and
strategic dialogue within his administration. His principal secretaries of
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defense were functionalists, and Eisenhower viewed their primary role as one
of keeping the Pentagon programs
within the budget, which was important
for carrying out his conservative fiscal
goals. On strategic matters, Eisenhower
dealt directly with the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and thus usurped
an important portion of the secretary of
defense’s role. He respected his secretaries as businessmen but in effect insisted on being his own secretary of
defense.
Thematic throughout this collection is a
focus on Asia and Europe. By stressing
Eisenhower’s response to grand strategy,
relations with Moscow, the interrelationship of politico-military-industrial
and techno-scientific affairs, and trouble spots in Eastern Europe, the Middle
East, and Asia, the book ignores the
twenty-first-century challenges posed
for contemporary U.S. defense and foreign policy in the Southern Hemisphere—Africa and Latin America.
For the sophisticated and knowledgeable scholar, Forging the Shield likely
contains little new information, but it
will prove valuable to defense policy
and military history students needing
exposure to the Eisenhower era.
DOUGLAS KINNARD

author of President Eisenhower
and Strategy Management

Schencking, J. Charles. Making Waves: Politics,
Propaganda, and the Emergence of the Imperial
Japanese Navy, 1868–1922. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2005. 283pp. $57.95

Charles Schencking, in charting Japan’s
creation of the world’s third-largest
navy by 1922, illuminates the workings
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of the Japanese political system and the
evolution of both interservice rivalries
and civil-military relations in the decades preceding World War II. He bases
his history on an impressive reading of
Japanese and English-language primary
and secondary sources to produce a
story with political implications far beyond the history of one service.
When the Meiji reformers took power
in 1868, their minimal naval forces
were part of their land forces. In 1871,
over the objections of the army, the
Military Ministry was subdivided into
two ministries, army and navy. In order
to secure funding to create a modern
fleet, the navy soon allied with the Satsuma clans, while clans from ChÇshÇ
were already allied with the army.
Together these clans brought the Meiji
reformers to power. The opening of the
Diet in 1890 brought fears among the
clans that democracy would erode their
power. Therefore, they solidified their
ties with the army and navy. Thus
highly politicized interservice rivalries
were inherent in the Japanese political
system.
Initial Diets were hostile to military
funding. War with China in 1894–95,
however, transformed the public perception of the navy from a financial
burden into a service vital to Japan’s
national security and domestic prosperity. This, combined with the large war
indemnity from China, produced massive naval budgetary increases. The naval mission expanded from defense of
the home islands to command of the
sea and defense of the empire. The
navy continued to press for a combat
mission independent of the army,
which retained responsibility for national defense and command over
naval forces in wartime. Interservice
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